



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines


Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>



DA

957

.Q6

Mr. John Morley and Home Rule.

THE
ARGUMENTS AGAINST HOME RULE
UNANSWERED BY MR. MORLEY.

A Critical Study,

IN TWO PARTS.

BY

ALBERT W. QUILL, M.A.

DEDICATED TO

The Irish Loyal and Patriotic Union.

DUBLIN:

HODGES, FIGGIS, AND CO., GRAFTON STREET,

PUBLISHERS TO THE UNIVERSITY.

1888.

PRICE SIXPENCE.

6 4³ 12¹/₂ carb

63 1

Mr. John Morley and Home Rule.

THE
ARGUMENTS AGAINST HOME RULE
UNANSWERED BY MR. MORLEY.

A Critical Study,

IN TWO PARTS.

BY

ALBERT W. QUILL, M.A.

=

DEDICATED TO


The Irish Loyal and Patriotic Union.

DUBLIN:

HODGES, FIGGIS, AND CO., GRAFTON STREET,

PUBLISHERS TO THE UNIVERSITY.

1888.



MR. JOHN MORLEY AND HOME RULE.

PART I.

WHEN a thinker so profound, a stylist so unique, a scholar so learned, and a man so sincere, as John Morley enters the political arena as a champion of the Irish Home Rule movement, it is only reasonable and natural that all upholders of the Legislative Union should inquire whether or no Mr. Morley has essayed to answer the three leading and fundamental arguments against the severance of that Union, and the establishment of an Irish Parliament in College Green.

If upon examination it be found that Mr. Morley has not attempted to answer those arguments, we may fairly ask ourselves why he has not made the attempt; and the object of this Essay will be to show the reason why he has never really confronted the three great arguments against Home Rule.

Those three fundamental arguments will be clearly and concisely stated in the second part of this Essay, and it will be shown that Mr. Morley has never answered or substantially and really attempted to answer them; and, furthermore, he will be invited to answer them if he can when addressing his great Gladstone-Parnell or Parnell-Gladstone audience in the Leinster Hall in this city.

The object of the first part of this Essay will be to prepare the mind of the reader for the accurate apprehension of Mr. Morley's

political motives, and a full grasp of the true reason of Mr. Morley's argumentative weakness in dealing with the Irish problem.

When our readers have had an insight into the philosophical principles, social views, and the ethical standpoint of Mr. Morley, as expounded and enunciated in his writings, they will then be in a position to judge the reason why he has taken his stand on the side of Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Parnell, and why he has not answered the three great arguments against Home Rule which, as already observed, will be set forth in the second part of this Essay.

No generous adversary will refuse his tribute of admiration for the splendid originality of Mr. Morley's writings, for the individuality and characteristic colouring of his style, and for the thrilling pulsations of thought that throb through every line. But the fire that glows and burns does not light our path, but leaves us distraught and in darkness.

" Yet from those flames
No light ; but rather darkness visible
Served only to discover sights of woe,
Regions of sorrow, doleful shades, where peace
And rest can never dwell, hope never comes,
That comes to all."

The literary and intellectual life of John Morley has been devoted to the study and analysis of the careers and works of the three great heralds of the French Revolution—Voltaire, Jean Jacques Rousseau, and Denis Diderot.

Let us as clearly as possible understand what the principles of these three celebrated writers were, and how far Mr. Morley adopts their views and has imbibed their philosophy.

Voltaire and Diderot were the same in kind, although differing in degree ; Rousseau was the antithesis of both, and his principles were essentially opposed to theirs.

The creed of Voltaire was, according to Mr. Morley ("Voltaire," p. 287) himself, " a creed of negation." We ourselves prefer

to use the term invented by Professor Huxley, and describe the French philosopher as an "agnostic"—a term which, according to the new philological dictionary, means "one who holds that the existence of anything beyond and behind material phenomena is unknown, and (so far as can be judged) unknowable, and especially that a first cause and an unseen world are subjects of which we know nothing." Voltaire has summed up his agnostic philosophy thus (Morley's "Voltaire," p. 286):—

"Well, nobody thinks of giving an immortal soul to a flea; why should you give one any the more to an elephant, or a monkey, or my Champagne valet, or my village steward, who has a trifle more instinct than my valet?"

And again, in his celebrated poem on the earthquake of Lisbon, he puts forth the creed of negation with startling dramatic force (Morley's "Voltaire," p. 284):—

"Lisbonne, qui n'est plus, eut-elle plus de vices
Que Londres, que Paris, plongés dans les délices?
Lisbonne est abîmée, et l'on danse à Paris."

Yet this creed of negation—this black agnosticism—had not taken its final hold on the mind and heart of Voltaire until he had lived through half his life. In the earlier portion of his career his mind inclined towards Deism, and the softening influence of belief in a Supreme Being may be traced in the lines cited by Mr. Morley ("Voltaire," p. 281):—

"Oui, dans le sein de Dieu, loin de ce corps mortel,
L'esprit semble écouter la voix de l'Eternel."

One would imagine that this early tendency on the part of Voltaire towards Deism might have evoked some commendation from Mr. Morley; but, instead of that, we find the biographer explaining his Deism away as an early and temporary weakness. On this subject Mr. Morley thus expresses himself ("Voltaire," pp. 280-282):—

"We have spoken of Voltairean Deism, and the expression is a convenient one to distinguish from the various forms of mystic theology,

which gloomily disclaim any pretence to be rational, the halting-place of spirits too deeply penetrated with the rationalistic objections of Voltaire to accept revelation, and either too timorous or too confident to acquiesce in a neutral solution. It is unjust, however, to attribute to Voltaire himself a perfect adherence to the Deistical idea. For the first half of his life there is no doubt that it floated in his mind, as in so many others, in a random manner, as the true explanation of the world. To have a conception of perfect goodness was a manifest convenience in confronting men who were to be proved masters of badness. But when the pressure of circumstances forced Voltaire to seek in earnest for an explanation of the world, which he had formerly been content to take in an easy way upon trust, then the Deism, which had been barely more than nominal at best, was transformed into a very different and far sincerer mood."

It is tolerably clear from this extract that the creed of negation and the philosophy of agnosticism constitute, in the opinion of Mr. Morley, a far sincerer mood than the mental weakness of the man who has a vague tendency to believe in the Supreme Being. This must be so from Mr. Morley's *point d'appui*, who, with the logical consistency of a thorough agnostic, treats Deism as weakness to be pitied and despised; and, passing from the vaguer forms of theosophy to the more defined tenets of Christianity—especially as formulated in the doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church—displays a rabid fanaticism and an intensity of hate that stamp him as the mortal foe of Revelation. We will cite his own words on the system of the Christian Churches ("Voltaire," pp. 42, 43):—

"Let the scientific spirit move people to speak as it lists about Voltaire's want of respect for things held sacred, for the good deeds of holy men, for the sentiment and faith of thousands of the most worthy among his fellows. Still, there are times when it may be very questionable whether, in the region of belief, one with power and with fervid honesty ought to spare the abominable city of the plain, just because it happens to shelter five righteous. There are times when the inhumanity of a system stands out so red and foul, when the burden of its iniquity weighs so heavy, and the contagion of its hypocrisy is so laden with mortal plague, that no awe of dilettante condemnation, nor minute scruple as to the historic or the relative, can stay the hand of the man whose direct sight and moral energy have pierced the veil of use, and revealed the

shrine of the infamous thing. The most noble of the holy men said long ago that 'the servant of the Lord must not strive, but be gentle unto all men, apt to teach, patient, in meekness instructing those that oppose themselves.' The history of the Churches is, in one of its most conspicuous aspects, the history of a prolonged outrage upon these words by arrogant and blasphemous persons, pretending to draw a sacred spirit from the very saint who uttered them. We may well deplore that Voltaire's attack, and every other attack of the same sort, did not take the fair shape prescribed by the apostle to the servant of the Lord, of gentleness, patience, and the instruction of a sweet and firm example. But the partisans of the creed in whose name more human blood has been violently shed than in any other cause whatever, these, I say, can hardly find much ground of serious reproach in a few score epigrams. Voltaire had no calm breadth of wisdom. It may be so. There are moments which need not this calm breadth of wisdom, but a two-edged sword, and when the deliverers of mankind are they who come to set fire on the earth."

The extracts that we have already given seem to prove conclusively that Mr. Morley is a resolute agnostic and a firm believer in "the creed of negation." We have seen how he regards the shadowy Deism, the vague theosophy, of Voltaire's early life as a mere weakness and insincerity, and speaks of the dark agnosticism of the French philosopher's more mature years as "a far sincerer mood." We shall see subsequently that the fervid and emotional Deism of Rousseau has not in the least subdued the fixed scepticism of Mr. Morley, and we shall finally consider whether or no our distinguished visitor has adopted the gross materialism of Diderot, who so debased the doctrine of Epicurus and profaned the shrine of the sublime Lucretius.

Jean Jacques Rousseau was the antithesis of Voltaire. Rousseau, in whom the emotional faculties were so intensely developed, was a fervid Deist and enthusiastic believer in a Supreme Being and Governor of the Universe—a believer in a future state, and in the life to come, and in the reward of the just and punishment of the wicked. In his "Social Contract" he makes these beliefs dogmas, enforceable by the civil power, inflicting banishment on all who refused to subscribe to them, and awarding the penalty of death as the doom of subscribers who were guilty of recalcitrancy.

Had the dream of "The Social Contract" ever been realised, and the ideas of Jean Jacques passed from the realms of theory and fancy into the region of accomplished facts, the very first person to be banished and expelled from the socialistic and communistic confraternity would be John Morley, the biographer of Rousseau, the obdurate agnostic, the apostle of the creed of negation.

In his work on Rousseau, Mr. Morley's bias against the Deism of Jean Jacques is manifest. To take one out of numerous examples. Rousseau, in his "Confessions," has observed of Voltaire, as translated by Mr. Morley ("Rousseau," Vol. I., p. 811):—

"Voltaire, in seeming always to believe in God, never really believed in anybody but the devil, since his pretended God is a maleficent being who, according to him, finds all his pleasure in working mischief. The absurdity of this doctrine is especially revolting in a man crowned with good things of every sort, and who from the midst of his own happiness tries to fill his fellow-creatures with despair by the cruel and terrible image of the serious calamities from which he is himself free."

Mr. Morley thus comments on this criticism ("Rousseau," Vol. I., p. 811):—

"As if any doctrine could be more revolting than this which Rousseau so quietly takes for granted, that if it is well with me, and I am free from calamities, then there must needs be a beneficent ruler of the universe, and the calamities of all the rest of the world, if by chance they catch the fortunate man's eye, count for nothing in our estimate of the method of the supposed divine government."

And again (p. 814), in answer to Rousseau's well-founded argument, that apparent evil in the universe is explained on the principle that the good of the whole is to be sought before the good of the part, Mr. Morley observes:—

"All this is, no doubt, very well said, and we are bound to accept it as true doctrine. Although, however, it may make resignation easier by explaining the nature of evil, it does not touch the point of Voltaire's

outburst, which is, that evil exists, and exists in shapes which it is a mere mockery to associate with the omnipotence of a benevolent controller of the world's forces."

Mr. Morley has never for a moment yielded to the Deistical influences of Rousseau; but, as an unswerving adherent of Voltaire, and an ardent apostle of the creed of negation, he assails the system of the Roman Catholic Church with all the open fury of a fanatic. Thus ("Rousseau," Vol. II., p. 201):—

"The new current flowed in channels far away from that black folly of superstition. Men at length ventured once more to look at one another with free and generous gaze. The veil of the temple was rent, and the false mockeries of the shrine of the Hebrew divinity made plain to scornful eyes. People ceased to see one another as guilty victims cowering under a divine curse. They stood erect in the consciousness of manhood. The palsied conception of man, with his large discourse of reason looking before and after, his lofty and majestic patience in search for new forms of beauty and new secrets of truth, his sense of the manifold sweetness and glory and awe of the universe; above all, his infinite capacity of loyal pity and love for his comrades in the great struggle, and his high sorrow for his own wrong-doing—the palsied and crushing conception of this excellent and helpful being as a poor worm, writhing under the vindictive and meaningless anger of an omnipotent tyrant in the large heavens, only to be appeased by sacerdotal intervention, was fading back into those regions of night whence the depth of human misery and the obscuration of human intelligence had once permitted its escape to hang evilly over the western world for a season."

So far we have seen that Mr. Morley, like Voltaire, is a confirmed agnostic. We now come to deal with Jean Jacques Rousseau as a socialist and communist, and will soon perceive that if Mr. Morley has rejected the Deism of the Geneva dreamer, he has caught up the spirit of socialism and communism of the author of "The Social Contract."

The socialistic and communistic principles of Rousseau, as formulated by him in "The Social Contract" ("the Gospel of the Jacobins"), may be thus briefly summarised. Rousseau was convinced that the natural state and the really happy state

of man was his primitive condition before he was blighted by the curse of civilisation. The first condition, therefore, of his ideal society was, that each member of that society should place his person and his property at the disposal of the entire community, each member of which was to be an equal and indivisible portion of the whole. This doctrine was the foundation of the grand revolutionary formula, "*Liberté, fraternité, égalité*." In enunciating this doctrine, Rousseau had not, according to Mr. Morley, pointed out distinctly what was the real plague-spot of society as at present constituted, which Mr. Morley considers has been clearly done by Morelly the Younger (Morley's "*Rousseau*," Vol. L, pp. 156-158), of whose revolutionary concepts our distinguished visitor thus expresses his approval:—

"Then he [Morelly] strikes to the root of society with a directness that Rousseau could not imitate, by the position, that 'these laws (i.e., existing society), by establishing a monstrous division of the products of nature, and even of their very elements, by dividing what ought to have remained entire, or ought to have been restored to entireness if any accident had divided them, aided and favoured the break-up of all sociability.' All political and all moral evils are the effects of this pernicious cause—private property. He says of Rousseau's first discourse, that the writer ought to have seen that the corruption of manners which he set down to literature and art, really came from this venomous principle of property, which infects all that it touches."

This "venomous principle of property" was not only assailed by the blood-stained Robespierre and Danton, but also even now, at our own door, by the leaders of "The Plan of Campaign" and the promulgators of "The No-rent Manifesto." But let us clearly understand that neither Rousseau nor Morelly could approve of "The Plan of Campaign," or of "The No-rent Manifesto," for, according to the principles of "The Social Contract," private property was to be surrendered, not for the benefit of any class, but for the benefit of the entire community. According to the principles of Rousseau, the private

to be

property of the tenants would be no more exempt than the private property of the landlords, so that even under "The Social Contract" there would be reciprocity of advantage and reciprocity of obligation. But under "The Plan of Campaign" and under "The No-rent Manifesto" the spoliation is all on one side. The second canon of "The Social Contract" was "the sovereignty of the people," which, as well put by Mr. Morley, meant that the sovereign and the body politic are one and the same thing, inasmuch as the sovereign is composed of each individual citizen.

There are several other conditions laid down in "The Social Contract," but as we consider that the two canons already summarised constitute the fundamental basis of Rousseau's ideal State, we do not intend to take our readers through the details of the system.

It would seem to us that Mr. Morley, by appearing openly and deliberately on the same platform as the leaders of "The Plan of Campaign," stands forth as the advocate of a communism worse than the theory of Rousseau. Mr. Morley approves of the ruin of one class (the landlords), not for the amelioration but for the demoralisation of another class (the tenants), whereas even Rousseau would, in theory at least, confer equal benefits on every class in the community.

Mr. Morley, it is true, criticises the plan of Rousseau's "Social Contract" as a vain dream, but at the same time takes care to put forth his own aspirations in the following ("Rousseau," Vol. II., pp. 195-196) eloquent passage :—

"But we may perhaps take courage from history to hope that generations may come, to whom our system of distributing among a few the privileges and delights that are procured by the toil of the many, will seem just as wasteful, as morally hideous, and as scientifically indefensible as that older system which impoverished and depopulated empires, in order that a despot or a caste might have no least wish ungratified for which the lives or the hard-won treasure of others could suffice."

Surely after this our readers can scarcely be surprised to find

Mr. Morley and the leaders of "The Plan of Campaign" co-operating with enthusiasm to confer the wealth of the few upon the many—not through the medium of honest toil, not by means of sustained labour and continuous industry, not through legitimate channels and observance of the law of the land, but by violence and rapine and defiance of the law. So far we have found Mr. Morley a confirmed agnostic and a socialist, not perhaps of the Rousseau type, but certainly in unison with the modern socialistic school; and we are not now surprised to see him on the same platform as the leaders of "The Plan of Campaign."

We have already observed that Voltaire and Diderot were the same in kind, although differing in degree.

Voltaire was an agnostic. Diderot was an aggressive atheist, and his feelings towards Christianity are well portrayed in his own ferocious couplet:—

*"Et ses mains ourdiraient les entrailles du prêtre,
Au défaut d'un cordon pour étrangler les rois."*

Take as an example of Mr. Morley's aggression a short passage where the writer thus comments on the period immediately preceding the publication of the Encyclopædia. ("Diderot," Vol. I., p. 2):—

"For the moment a churchman might be pardoned if he thought that superstition, ignorance, abusive privilege, and cruelty were on the eve of the smoothest and most triumphant days that they had known since the Reformation. We now know how illusory this sanguine anticipation was destined to prove, and how promptly. In little more than forty years after the triumphant enforcement of the odious system of confessional certificates, then the crowning event of ecclesiastical supremacy, Paris saw the Feast of the Supreme Being and the adoration of the Goddess of Reason."

But Diderot was not only an aggressive atheist, he was likewise, as we shall see presently, a confirmed materialist.

As materialism and atheism are naturally connected with each other, a very brief reference to Diderot's and Mr. Morley's

position in this regard will be quite sufficient for our readers. Diderot was the disciple and boon companion of Holbach, and Holbach was the real and substantial founder of the French school of materialism. "The System of Nature," published in 1770, laid down the great canon of the materialists, that everything that affects our senses is matter of some kind or other. With Holbach and Diderot "mind," as put by Mr. Morley, "is only an occult force invented to explain occult qualities and actions, and really explaining nothing."

After a graphic description of the struggle of Holbach's contemporaries "with the tusks and hooked claws of the Church" ("Diderot," Vol. II., p. 168), Mr. Morley announces (p. 182) that he does not dissent from the materialist conclusions of Holbach, differing only from him in a stricter regard for the historical method of treatment. Diderot not only adopted the materialism of Holbach, who was his constant companion, but debased the philosophy of his master by a treatment of the subject so coarse and revolting that Mr. Morley is obliged to confine himself to a slender passing reference. The dialogue entitled "D'Alembert's Dream" is declared by the biographer to be "as odious as anything since the freaks of filthy Diogenes in his tub," and although the materialistic dialogues of Diderot are declared to be "in form the most ugly and disgusting piece in the literature of philosophy," they at the same time are said to "testify in their own way to Diderot's sincerity of interest in his subject."

We observe with regret that Mr. Morley, while giving at length Diderot's erroneous and false example of spontaneous generation founded upon the process in an egg ("Diderot," Vol. II., p. 274), has not had the moral courage to admit the hopeless break-down of Professor Tyndall's attempt to prove the possibility of spontaneous generation in his memorable address to the British Association.

Mr. Morley may object to the coarseness of Diderot's materialism, but he has adopted his conclusions and has imbibed his

principles, as the following passage will abundantly show ("Diderot," Vol. I., p. 8) :—

"Forty years ago, when Carlyle wrote, it might really seem to a prejudiced observer as if the encyclopædic tree had borne no fruit. Even then, and even when the critic happened to be a devotee of the sterile transcendentalism then in vogue, one might have expected some recognition of the fact, that the seed of all the great improvements bestowed on France by the Revolution, in spite of the woeiful evils which followed in its train, had been sown by the encyclopædists. But now that the last vapours of the transcendental reaction are clearing away, we see that the movement initiated by the encyclopædia is still in full progress. Materialistic solutions in the science of man, humanitarian ends in legislation, naturalism in art, active faith in the improbability of institutions—all these are once more the marks of speculation and the guiding ideas of practical energy. The philosophical parenthesis is at an end. The interruption of eighty years counts for no more than the twinkling of an eye in the history of the transformation of the basis of thought. And the interruption has for the present come to a close. Europe again sees the old enemies face to face : the Church, and a Social Philosophy slowly labouring to build her foundations in positive science. It cannot be other than interesting to examine the aims, the instruments, and the degree of success of those who a century ago saw most comprehensively how profound and far-reaching a metamorphosis awaited the thought of the western world. We shall do this most properly in connection with Diderot."

A republic composed of the highest class of men, who were agnostics, materialists, and socialists, would, to say the least of it, be a very hazardous, dark, and gloomy institution. With no hope beyond the grave, no belief in anything but matter, no private property, even the highest natures would be strained to the utmost tension. What would be the result if such conditions existed among ordinary men and average natures? Voltaire, the sceptic, knew what would be the result. We are told by Mr. Morley ("Diderot," Vol. II., pp. 159, 160), that, when during a philosophical discussion the non-existence of the Deity was being maintained in a vigorous argument, Voltaire astonished the company by ordering the servants to leave the room, and then proceeding to lock the door. "Gentlemen," he explained, "I do not wish my valet to cut my throat to-morrow

morning." "It was not," says Mr. Morley, "the truth of the theistic belief in itself that Voltaire prized, but its supposed utility as an assistant to the police." And such was the result in France. The mob assimilated all that was bad and eliminated all that was good in Voltaire, in Diderot, and in Rousseau. The mob assimilated the agnosticism of Voltaire, but eliminated his love of social order and regard for economic laws. The mob assimilated the socialism and communism of Rousseau, but eliminated his sincere Deism and ardent belief in a future world. The mob assimilated the atheism of Diderot and his materialism, but rejected his scientific method. And then the horror of the French Revolution burst forth upon a terror-stricken world!

Is there no danger that the Irish populace will assimilate the social philosophy of Mr. Morley, and naturally enough associate his socialistic views with the furtherance of "The Plan of Campaign" or another no-rent manifesto?

Completely absorbed in the life study of this social philosophy, it will be found upon examination that all Mr. Morley's arguments on the Irish question are social arguments—not jurisprudential—not historical—not practical—not from an English point of view—not as one proud of the glory of the British Empire.

The second part of this Essay will deal with the three leading and fundamental arguments against Home Rule, will endeavour to show that Mr. Morley has never answered them, and will invite him to attempt an answer now before his audience in the Leinster Hall.

PART II.

There are three fundamental arguments against Home Rule which, so far as we are aware, have never been substantially answered. Some of our opponents have attempted an answer, but have never succeeded. Mr. Morley has never even made the attempt. When those of our readers who have taken the trouble to peruse the first part of this Essay shall have considered these arguments, they will then easily be able to understand why Mr. John Morley has never sought to answer them.

The first fundamental argument against Home Rule is this :—The system of Federal Government, which is the meaning of “Home Rule,” as formulated in Mr. Gladstone’s Home Rule Bill, can never work successfully unless the countries forming the federation are cemented by unity of interest. They must co-operate towards the attainment of a common object which is for their common good, and which constitutes the unity of their interests. Eminent writers on Federal Government speak of unity of race as being also an almost essential condition, and for this reason—that difference of race generally (although not always) involves difference and divergence of interests. But sometimes the pressure of dangerous surroundings and the force of circumstances overcome the divergent tendencies of difference of race, and peoples of different stocks are welded by the iron hand of stern necessity into a compact federation, as is the case of Austria-Hungary. We may here cite with effect the weighty testimony of Count Beust, the ex-Chancellor of Austria-Hungary, who established the federal system which now regulates that Empire. In a letter to the *Times*, dated the 2nd of April, 1886, the Vienna correspondent of that journal reports

the result of an interview with that eminent statesman, who said :—

“Hungary could not exist apart from Austria. Surrounded by Slav States, it would be crushed out of life, swallowed up. Ireland, however, is an island, having no neighbour but England. Give it over to the government of a faction which hates the English, and, on the first occasion of a difference between England and America or France, it will be used as the basis for an attack upon England. This danger will become so apparent to the English, that their first thought, after having relaxed their hold upon the island, will be that they must reconquer it. The thing will have to be done some day, and, as the ultimate prospect of the Irish question is thus a war with the faction that hates England, it is better that the English should brace themselves to cope at once with that faction while they can do so with a certainty of success.”

Federal Government can therefore exist and work notwithstanding difference of race which is more than counterbalanced by the pressure of urgent necessity. But the system of Federal Government is never applicable, and can never exist or work, where there is no unity of interest between the States or countries attempting to form the federation. Where there is no unity, but a divergence and conflict of interest, between the federalising States, the federation can never have any real existence. Writing so far back as the year 1880 (in a letter to the Right Hon. W. E. Forster, Chief Secretary for Ireland, pp. 18, 19), we took occasion to observe :—

“Whether we trace the workings of the system in the history of the Achaean League, the Swiss Cantons, the United Netherlands, or the United States of America, we invariably find that the moment the Confederate States diverged from a great common interest, that moment the Federal bond strained under the tension ; the moment the community of interest ceased, that instant snapped the chain, and with a kind of political centrifugal force the various States flew off from their centre.”

Five years afterwards the Duke of Argyll, in a letter to the *Times* (29th December, 1885), when contrasting the essentially different conditions governing the union of the American States with the conditions which would apply to England and Ireland

under Mr. Gladstone's Home Rule Bill, conveyed his ideas through the same metaphor :—

“In the first place—observes his Grace—the initial force is not towards, but away from, union. It is centrifugal and not centripetal. This alone makes an enormous difference.”

As our readers are aware, the Federal system of government is based on two essential conditions. The first condition is, that each country or State composing the federation must have complete control over its own affairs. The second condition is, that the several States or countries must be completely subject to a common or central Power in all those matters or things which concern and relate to all the several countries or States collectively.

Thus, if Mr. Gladstone's terrible Home Rule Bill had become law, and in the course of years, and through unavoidable complications and over-mastering necessity, Her Majesty's Government should be compelled to declare war upon the United States of America, or upon the French Republic, would there be unity of interest between England and Ireland? Or would there not rather be absolute antagonism of interest and complete divergence? In the science of politics it is a cardinal rule that the statesman must be guided by the actual evidence furnished to him by current events and living public men. The greatest of all political writers—Aristotle—speaks of the political and practical life as one and the same, and as contradistinguished from theoretical or philosophical existence, which is abstracted far from the outside world. (Aristotle's “Politics”—Congreve's Edition—Book IV., cap. ii., sect. 5.)

Acting, therefore, on the evidence furnished to us by the Parnellite party, would there be unity and harmony of interest between England and Ireland (under Home Rule) in the event of a war with America, or France, or Russia? Or would there be antagonism and divergence of interest? *United Ireland*, in its issue of September the 19th, 1885, represents the views of

its editor, Mr. William O'Brien, M.P., thus (in a leading article) :—

“It is not as in the days when the Franco-Dutch armament waited in the Texel for a favouring wind till Tone's heart was sick, or when Hoche's ill-starred fleet was blown out of Bantry Bay like a fleet of cockle-shells. Any of these Powers could defy the winds and evade the world-scattered English fleet, and fling five or ten thousand veteran troops, with supplies of rifles, cannons, and officers, upon any given point of the Irish coast. And while an Irish rising with scythes and cudgels may seem the best joke in the world to Mr. Chamberlain, a French army in possession of Limerick, with all the hot-blooded youth of the country flocking thither to shoulder its hundred thousand French rifles and learn its French drill, coincidentally with an Irish conflagration throughout Durham and Lancashire, and an Irish eruption among the palaces and banking-houses of London city, would not furnish nearly such cheerful food for merriment to a Warrington audience.”

Again, as reported in his own paper, *United Ireland*, of the 21st February, 1885, Mr. William O'Brien, M.P., expressed his views on the relations between England and Ireland, in his speech at Letterkenny, County Donegal, on February 13th, 1885, thus :—

“If England's difficulty is Ireland's opportunity, as it is—(cheers)—England's difficulties are at this moment crowding pretty thick upon her. (Cheers.) (A voice—‘The Mahdi is the boy for her.’) Her trade is bad at home, and, as a voice behind me reminds me, her armies are not doing a bit too satisfactorily out in the country of that black gentleman, the Mahdi. (A voice—‘Three cheers for the Mahdi.’) . . . All sorts of new democratic forces are rising up, and if you, the people of Donegal and the people of Ireland, only do your part here at home, as Mr. Parnell and the men who fight under his banner will try to do in that foreign Parliament, in the citadel of the enemy, you will not have to wait long for the opportunity of vindicating the rights of Ireland, and driving famine, and landlordism, and English rule for ever from the shores of Ireland.”

Mr. Parnell, M.P.—the leader of the Irish Parliamentary party—is reported in the issue of *United Ireland* of January

24th, 1865, to have spoken at Cork, on January 21st, 1885, as follows :—

“ We cannot ask for less than restitution of Grattan’s Parliament—(loud cheers)—with its important privileges and far-reaching constitution. We cannot, under the British Constitution, ask for more than the restitution of Grattan’s Parliament. (Renewed cheering.) But no man has the right to fix the boundary to the march of a nation. (Great cheers.) No man has a right to say to his country, ‘ Thus far shalt thou go, and no farther ;’ and we have never attempted to fix *ne plus ultra* to the progress of Ireland’s nationhood, and we never shall.”

Again, in a leading article in *United Ireland* of March 7th, 1885, Mr. William O’Brien, M.P., thus refers to the Russian difficulty, which was at this time occupying the attention of Europe :—

“ It is quite possible, therefore, that the hour has struck for one of the most gigantic death-struggles in which England was ever engaged—one in which, perchance, Ireland may be destined to be a not altogether unimportant factor.”

We could cite innumerable utterances of various members of the Irish Parliamentary party to the same effect ; but it seems to us that the evidence already cited is enough to convince every practical politician that the political interest of Ireland is not in unison with the political interest of England, but, on the contrary, is in direct antagonism to it. We ask how it is possible that the Federal system could be successfully applied to the government of Ireland when the Home Rule Parliament in Dublin would (on the evidence of Messrs. Parnell and O’Brien) use its power “ to drive English rule for ever from the shores of Ireland,” and no attempt would be made “ to fix *ne plus ultra* to the progress of Ireland’s nationhood ” ?

We ask for the historical proof of a single instance in which Federal government was able to exist when the several parliaments, councils, or governments of the respective States or countries submitted to the experiment were in direct hostility

and antagonism to each other. Such an antagonism in our own times on the one question of slavery burst into fragments the Federal bond of the United States of America, and plunged the western world into all the horrors of a terrible civil war.

We have looked in vain through the speeches of Mr. Morley for any answer to this, the first fundamental argument against Home Rule. We have carefully perused in the *Times'* Parliamentary reports his two speeches in favour of the first and second reading of Mr. Gladstone's Home Rule Bill, and we seek in vain for any answer. We now ask Mr. Morley, when addressing his audience in the Leinster Hall, to answer this question—When the Home Rule representatives of the Irish people openly declare that a Home Rule Parliament in College Green would be regarded by them merely as one step in the process towards total and entire separation, is it possible for any fair-minded man to believe and hope that the London Parliament and the Dublin Parliament would work in harmony and unison and for the joint and common good of England and Ireland?

Mr. Morley has never yet answered this question. We ask him now to answer it, and give some intelligible reasons for his answer.

Why has not Mr. Morley attempted an answer before this? Because all his arguments are social arguments and the outcome of social philosophy. After informing the House of Commons (" *Times'* Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol. II., p. 188) that nobody in the House takes less of a rose-pink view of Irish politics than himself, and that he does not wish that we should live in a fool's paradise about Ireland, the learned gentleman proceeds to comment on the dark, and sinister, and subterraneous forces at work, but declares, at the same time, that he is not afraid of them, and treats all apprehension of a hostile Irish Parliament as an indictment preferred against the Irish constituencies. What is this but social dreaming? Are we not, Mr. Morley, to judge of the future by

the evidence supplied to us by the past and by the present? What other guide has the practical statesman? What other criterion has the practical politician?

Surely the man who paints a future in his mind, untinctured by the sober realities of the world around him, may fairly come within Aristotle's description of the theoretical philosopher whose life is abstracted far from all external influences.

So far we have seen that, on the evidence afforded to us by the deliberate public utterances of the members of the Irish Parliamentary party, there is not only no unity of interest between England and the Home Rule party in Ireland, but an openly declared antagonism manifested by a positive declaration that the Parliament in College Green will be used as a lever to effect a total separation of the two countries. It would be idle now for Mr. Parnell or Mr. O'Brien to attempt a retreat from the position which they have taken up, and contradict their former public utterances. Such a course would be merely to furnish what the lawyers call evidence *post litem motam*—evidence on which nobody could safely act. On the evidence *ante litem motam* (before the introduction of the Home Rule Bill) we find a manifest antagonism of interest between the Irish Home Rule party and England, and we find the leaders of the Irish Home Rule party declaring in public that the Parliament in College Green would be used as a means of effecting a total separation between the two countries. It seems to us that no English statesman having the interests of the British Empire at heart can, with this evidence before him, consent to a scheme which would of necessity strengthen the hands of England's enemies, and enable them to work with some prospect of success towards the real goal of their ambition—an Irish-American Republic.


We again solemnly request Mr. Morley to answer this first fundamental argument, and explain to us how England and the Irish Home Rule party (constituting, as they do, the numerical majority and intellectual minority of the Irish people), moving

upon lines of sharp antagonism of interest, could possibly work together in a federalism, the essence of which consists in the thorough co-operation of all the parts of the composite State, and the sympathetic action between the central Government and the local Parliament.

The second fundamental argument against Home Rule lies deep in the very nature of things, and is based on the geographical relations between England and Ireland. Ireland is an island planted athwart the very heart of England, whose greatness depends upon her naval supremacy. It is therefore impossible that England, as long as she is governed by statesmen who are true and loyal to her best interests, can ever run the risk of anything even approaching a separation between Ireland and herself. The occupation of Ireland by any hostile power would prove the death-blow of England, and the establishment of a Parliament in College Green would beyond all question furnish the separatists with a motive-power which would soon impel us at a constantly accelerated rate towards an absolute severance from English dominion. The English people can never tolerate this. Mr. Froude has in his admirable work on the English in Ireland well observed :—

“ When two countries, or sections of countries, stand geographically so related to one another that their union under a common government will conduce to the advantage of one of them, such countries will continue separate as long only as there is equality of force between them, or as long as the country which desires to preserve its independence possesses a power of resistance so vigorous that the effort to overcome it is too exhausting to be permanently maintained.”

At present there is no equality of force between the two countries, nor is there at present in Ireland any really vigorous power of resistance; but should the separatists, through the leverage of the hoped-for Parliament in College Green, work with energy (and possibly the assistance of some hostile foreign power) towards a complete severance, a reconquest of this country would become a stern and inexorable necessity, and the



English people would be taught at the cost of much blood and treasure how much better prevention is than cure. We again ask Mr. Morley how he as an Englishman—proud of the glories of the Empire—can justify a course which must (on the evidence before him) lead to the danger of a hostile occupation of Ireland, eventually necessitating re-conquest and all its attendant miseries? It is in vain for Mr. Morley to plead that once a Home Rule Parliament has been established in Dublin, all hostility between the two countries will cease, and the enduring bonds of a lasting unity will lock them in a federal embrace. Mr. Morley cannot rely on any such hope in the face of the open declaration of the Irish leaders that the Dublin Parliament will only be a step in the nation's march to absolute independence. We have searched the speeches of Mr. Morley in vain for anything like a substantial answer to this difficulty in the way of Home Rule. His social hopes are at variance with the evidence of plain facts—with evidence which challenges him as an Englishman to stand true to the great country of his birth—true to the greatest constitution in the world, under which true liberty is cherished, and it is only licence that is repressed. Or has the Social Philosophy converted Mr. Morley from an Englishman into a cosmopolitan, to whom all countries and all peoples are equally indifferent, except as furnishing materials for socialistic experiments?

We anxiously await Mr. Morley's reply to this second argument, which, although simple, is of the most far-reaching character.

The third fundamental argument against Home Rule is based on the proof that the material, commercial, and financial condition of Ireland, instead of advancing and improving, continuously retrograded and deteriorated during the entire period commencing with the establishment of an independent Irish Parliament—Grattan's Parliament—in 1782, and terminating with the Legislative Union of Great Britain and Ireland in 1800; and the same argument is based upon the further proof that the

THE
END

material, commercial, and financial condition of Ireland has advanced and improved since the date of the Legislative Union—1800—down to the present time. If it can be proved that the commerce of Ireland has declined under an Irish Parliament and vastly improved under the Union, it would seem absurdly illogical to look forward to an era of commercial prosperity under Home Rule. If carefully-prepared statistics are to be our guide, the commercial future of Home Rule would prove a future of financial decay, terminating in national bankruptcy.

Our readers will, of course, remember that an Irish Parliament proper commenced to exist in 1782, and ceased its career in the year 1800.

The Parliaments held in Ireland before that period (1782) had no independent existence, and under Poynings' Act could not originate a bill without the previous approval of the English Privy Council.

Let us therefore examine this brief life of the Irish Parliament proper, and draw our conclusions, from the authentic commercial statistics of that time. As soon as we have analysed this period of eighteen years preceding the Union, we may then turn our attention to an examination of the commercial progress of Ireland since the Union up to the present. We find from the official figures supplied to us that in ten years (from 1788 to 1797) the tonnage belonging to Irish ports fell from 60,776 tons in the year 1788 to 53,181 tons in the year 1797; that the ships built in Ireland during the decennial period immediately preceding the Union (1790 to 1799) fell from fifty ships built in the year 1790 to eighteen ships built in the year 1799; and that the Irish exports declined during the same decennial period by no less a sum than £1,632,145.

Again, for every 100 cwt. of sugar consumed in Ireland in the three years ending with 1791, only 91 cwt. were consumed during the three succeeding years, showing a fall of 8·9 per cent.

In corresponding triennial periods before the Union there was a fall of 26·8 per cent. in the consumption of wine, and a fall of 24·8 per cent. in the consumption of whiskey.

In corresponding quinquennial periods before the Union there was a fall of 43 per cent. in the consumption of tobacco.

Again, the Irish National Debt in the year 1791 amounted to £2,442,890. In the year 1800 the debt had increased to £25,662,640. Thus we may easily observe that during the existence of the Irish Parliament proper—1782 to 1800—the commercial condition of Ireland was a continuous and uniform process of decay.

Let us now direct our attention to the progress of Ireland's financial position since the Union. We find from the registered figures given that the tonnage of ships owned and registered at Irish ports during the years 1797, 1798, and 1799, amounted to the total of 112,333 tons, and that the Irish tonnage registered in the years 1843, 1844, and 1845 reached the sum-total of 631,981 tons, or an increase of 462·6 per cent.

Again, in the decennial period from 1790 to 1799, inclusive, 332 ships, representing a tonnage of 15,957 tons, had been built in Ireland, while in the decennial period from 1821 to 1830, inclusive, 415 ships, representing a tonnage of 20,733 tons, had been built in Ireland, showing an increase of 25·0 per cent. in ships, and 29·9 in tonnage.

Furthermore, the value of Irish imports from the year 1790 to the year 1801 amounted to £49,896,254, and the value of Irish exports during the same period reached £51,322,620. In the corresponding period of time since the Union—namely, 1802 to 1813—Irish imports amounted to £74,511,058, and Irish exports to £63,483,718, showing an increase of 50·8 and 23·7 respectively.

Moreover, in the year 1852 the tonnage inwards to Ireland was 3,047,941 tons, and the tonnage outwards from Ireland was 2,238,171 tons. In the year 1884 the tonnage inwards reached 6,723,269 tons, and the tonnage outwards 6,578,578 tons, showing an increase of 120·6 per cent. of tonnage inwards, and of 193·9 per cent. of tonnage outwards.

Once more, in the year 1852, the gross revenue of Ireland